Logical Empiricism and the Mind-Body Problem
Feigl 's approach can only be understood against the background of the goals of Logical Empiricism and its "analysis of language and meaning"l which shaped this century's philosophy of mind. In all of its phases, the attitude ofLogical Empiricism toward the mind-body problem is determined by adefinite monism. This applies to Schlick's "double-aspect theory", to Camap's phenomenalism in Der logische Aufbau der Welt as weIl as to his later physicalism and Reichenbach's empirical realism. 2 We should remember, however, that within Logical Empiricism the theoretical status of the mindbody problem is controversial: The problem is considered to be a pseudoproblem or, at least, one to be reduced to the logical analysis of mental terms. 3 Logical Empiricism held dualistic approaches in modem philosophy responsible for the emergence of the mind-body problem. According to its criticism, dualism inevitably leads to unjustifiable metaphysics 4 and semantic confusions that eventually induce the mind-body problem. That is why Logical Empiricism assumes that the mind-body problem will dissolve as soon as dualist approaches can be driven back.
Feigl has a more complex view with regard to the mind-body problem. Although his attitudes change during the development of his philosophy of mind, he adheres to the conviction that the mindbody problem is not a pseudoproblem. His different approaches are even characterised by the attempt to integrate formal structures of epistemological and linguistic dualism into a monist framework. Therefore, Feigl has to be conceded a special role within Logical Empiricism, which had understood itself -ifwe put aside Schlick's early works -as the position of an uncompromising monism. Due to its radical monism the relation ofLogical Empiricism to philosophy
